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Abstract—Recent research in multimedia forensics has developed a variety of methods to detect image
tampering and to identify the origin of image files. Many of these techniques are based on characteristics
in the JPEG format, as it is the most used file format for digital images. In recent years RAW image formats
have gained popularity among amateur and professional photographers. This increase in their use and possible
misuse makes these file formats an important subject to file forensic examinations. The aim of this paper is
to explore to which extend methods previously developed for images in JPEG format can be applied to RAW
image formats.
Index Terms—digital image forensics, image file forensics, RAW image formats, tamper detection
I. INTRODUCTION
In digital photography, JPEG is the most commonly
used file format for digital images. Especially as storage
format in digital cameras, it has been used by most
manufacturers since the beginning of commercial digital
photography in the late 1990s. With higher demands on
image quality and growing importance of digital post-
processing, raw file formats come into focus, providing
access to never processed sensor data. These are generally
referred to as RAW image formats. Although not used on
most compact cameras, these formats are now widely avai-
lable as an option in digital single lens refractor (DSLR)
cameras. Just as negatives in analogue photography they
provide a high quality version with a wider colour range
and higher resolution, from which the final image can
be developed and have therefore sometimes been referred
to as ’digital negatives’. In contrast to JPEG files, RAW
images can only be decoded by special software and
codecs that are not pre-installed on common operating
systems. Consequently RAW file formats can be found
as backup file on a local hard drive rather than being
published online. Common image processing software do
not allow to save images in these formats. RAW images are
therefore regarded as much more trustworthy as a JPEG
compressed version. For images in a research context,
the guidelines by Cromey [1] even suggest RAW image
formats as reference files that can later be compared to a
processed version. It is nevertheless possible to manipulate
RAW image files, although special software is required to
do so. Consequently it is desirable to detect whether or
not it has been manipulated. It has been shown by Kee
et al. [2] that extracting a signature from header parameters
can effectively be used for image authentication in JPEG
images. Building on their method we show that a similar
approach can also be used on three of the most common
RAW image formats.
II. RECENT RESEARCH ON JPEG FILES
Multimedia forensic techniques on JPEG files can
mainly be divided into two categories. Both categories
try to identify characteristics in the file that can give
clues on devices and software, used to create it. The
first analysing the information stored in the file header
for characteristics of the encoding software. The other
focusing on a statistical analysis of image data using
manipulation artefacts and device characteristics.
A. JPEG File Information
The JPEG file format allows to store the compressed
image data together with all necessary parameters for de-
compression. It is also possible to store metadata including
information of camera settings, identifying serial numbers
and time and location of image acquisition. Recent re-
search has shown that this information stored in JPEG file
headers can help to uncover the creation and processing
history of an image. The file header consists of a series of
segments, each tagged with a specific marker. Although
the JFIF standard defines exactly how the information is
stored in these segments, there are vendor specific segment
markers. The APP14 segment for example is specifically
used by Adobe, to store information about the software
version and the compression quality that was used for post-
processing. Gloe [3] showed that the sequence of all JPEG
marker segments in a file can be camera manufacturer or
software specific. Apart from that the characteristics of the
data stored in the segments and the combination of these
characteristics, can be used very effectively to identify the
source camera or whether an image has been altered by
software.
Common formats to store metadata are EXIF, IPTC
and XMP. Also manufacturer-specific formats are used
by camera and software manufacturers. Almost all digital
cameras store their metadata in the EXIF format as part
of the JPEG file. This format contains a variety of tags,
unique byte signatures specified in the EXIF standard [4],
that are used to identify the information in the binary file.
Using these tags information about the camera, technical
details of the photograph and the date and time it was
shot can be stored in the APP1 segment. This includes
information about the camera manufacturer, model and
2time of acquisition. Sometimes, even serial numbers of
the camera body or a interchangeable lens are stored in
this segment. Has this information been deleted or altered
in the file, other metadata can also give clues on the source
device. To give an example, image dimensions dependent
on the chip size and processing algorithm are specific
to one manufacturer, small group of camera models or
even a single model. The marker notes tag also provides
a segment where a manufacturer specific set of tags and
therefore more detailed information about the camera and
shot can be stored. Alvarez [5] discussed the use of EXIF
information in a computer forensic examination. He stated
that this information can never stand on its own and must
be examined together with the photo’s context.
As a part of JPEG compression, the quantization stage
depends on a set of parameter tables, known as Define
Quantization Tables (DQT). Two or more tables are stored
in the header of every JPEG file. The use of these tables
in the detection of image forgery was discussed in a paper
by Kornblum [6], following a study by Farid [7]. Camera
manufacturers and software companies often use custom
quantization tables, suitable to identify groups of camera
models using the same quantisation table. Also a sepa-
ration between authentic image files and post-processed
image files is possible, as software vendors employ their
own quantisation tables. Source devices and programmes
that use the standard quantization tables proposed by
Independent JPEG Group (IJG) in 1998 cannot be deter-
mined by the tables alone, as they are not manufacturer
specific. In some cases, more than two quantization tables
are used, which can be another characteristic parameter.
Define Huffman Tables (DHT), another set of parameters
that is needed for JPEG compression can be used in the
same manor. In 2008, Farid [8] did a follow up study on
his paper of 2006, concluding, that analysing quantization
tables “is reasonably effective at narrowing the source of
an image to a single camera make and model or to a small
set of possible cameras” (2008).
JPEG file headers also include a number of thumb-
nail images, used for previewing an image. The creation
of a thumbnail inside a camera consists of a series
of processing steps, including filtering, adjustments and
compression. Kee and Farid [9] have shown that these
parameters vary significantly between camera manufactu-
rers and photo-editing software. As thumbnails are JPEG
compressed themselves they store compression details
such as DQT and DHT, which can be used in the same
way as in a regular image file. Their dimensions are also a
significant parameter. Furthermore not every software will
update every thumbnail when saving an image. In these
cases a low quality version of the deleted areas might exist,
to give, combined with the remaining photo segment, a
general idea about the original content.
Kee et al. [2] suggested a method using a combination
of all these features, concluding: “Specifically, 62% of
images have a signature that is unique to a single camera,
80% of images have a signature that is shared by three
or fewer cameras, and 99% of images have a signature
that is unique to a single manufacturer.” (2011). Their
findings also indicate that it is still hard to distinguish
manipulated images from e.g. RAW Images that have been
converted to JPEG by software. In this case the software
can influence the Quantization tables, image dimensions
and the EXIF segment. These files might than have the
same characteristics as a JPEG file, processed with that
specific software.
EXIF information is not inherent to each image and can
easily be edited or replaced. To avoid detection, the whole
header can be replaced, altered or faked. But, apart from
editing EXIF information, this is not a feature of modern
image processing software. Also the findings of Kee et al.
[2] show, that it takes more than changing a single feature
of the file header, when faking another image source
III. RAW IMAGE FILES FORENSICS
A. Structure of RAW File Formats
In this section we will examine the structure of the two
most commonly used proprietary RAW formats: the Nikon
Electronic Format (NEF) and CR2, the second version of
the Camera Image File Format (CIFF) [10]. Additionally,
we will take a closer look on Adobe’s Digital Negative
(DNG) [11], as it not only promises to be the format
for future archiving, but also gets increasingly used in
high-end middle format cameras. It is also the only RAW
format in this examination, for which a full documentation
is available. Therefore the examination of the structure
of RAW files has to be based on observable rules in
the general file structure. All three of these formats, like
most RAW image formats are based on the Tagged Image
File (TIFF) Standard. In the first section in every TIFF
based file, the header, a magic number to mark it as a
TIFF file, information about the byte order and a pointer
to the following section are given. CR2 files have an
extended header, including also a magic number, version
and subversion for CR2 and an additional pointer to the
raw image data.
The next segment is the first of a number of Image
File Directory (IFD) segments. Each of these segments
represents a sub file, an image in most cases. It contains
information about the image and points to the binary image
data in the file. The first segment (IFD#0), contains not
only most of the metadata, the EXIF and Makernotes IFD,
but also information about a preview or thumbnail image
it represents. In total, mostly there are four versions of a
camera image in all three RAW formats: a high resolution
JPEG compressed preview image, a low resolution JPEG
compressed thumbnail, an uncompressed low resolution
image and finally lossless compressed raw image data
without any post-processing applied. These are stored
in separate IFD segments. NEF as well as DNG files
embed all following segments as sub-IFDs in IFD#0 while
the format CR2 employs individual major IFDs to store
information.
B. Counter Forensic Techniques
There are several software packages available, that are
capable of modifying or deleting segments in RAW image
files. ExifTool [12] provides a wide range of alteration
functionalities. It allows to modify, copy and delete meta-
data by entry, segment or as a whole. Using this function,
information about the image that is saved in the file, e.g. ti-
mestamps, the camera model and the camera manufacturer
3Table I
STRUCTURE OF COMMON RAW FILE FORMATS
Structure TIFF CR2 NEF DNG
Header 0-1: Byte order
2-3: TIFF magic number
4-7: Offset to 1st IFD
0-1: Byte order
2-3: TIFF magic number
4-7: Offset to 1st IFD
8-9: CR2 magic number
10: CR2 major version
11: CR2 minor version
12-15: RAW IFD Offset
0-1: Byte order
2-3: TIFF magic number
4-7: Offset to 1st IFD
0-1: Byte order
2-3: TIFF magic number
4-7: Offset to 1st IFD
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can be manipulated. Furthermore preview images of CR2
files can be extracted from or embedded in the file. Making
any of these changes normally includes resaving the file,
which will update the ‘modified date’ entry in the file.
ExifTool offers a function to synchronize the modified date
with other dates in the files metadata. Therefore modifica-
tions such as exchanging preview images or modifying the
‘model’ entry cannot be detected by a difference between
the created and the modified date.
C. Examination
For this examination we collected a number of parame-
ters from a total of 225 sample images in the three different
RAW file formats, whose structure we have discussed in
this paper. These images were created by 51 different
camera models from three different manufacturers. Speci-
fically 22 Canon, 24 Nikon and 5 Pentax camera models
were used. In order to examine the DNG format we
also converted CR2 and NEF files using Adobe’s DNG
Converter [13]. The proposed method does not aim at
identifying whether a single entry, such as the date and
time information, has been altered. It will however try
to authenticate the camera maker and model entries by
analysing the file information and general structure. Apart
from DNG, RAW file formats are already manufacturer
specific. Based on the approach on JPEG files by Kee
et al [8] we examined how a combination of metadata
parameters and characteristics in preview and thumbnail
images stored in RAW files can be used to identify a
group of cameras or even a single model. For this matter
ExifTool was used to analyse the structure and metadata
of each file. Thumbnail and preview images were then
extracted and analysed using JPEGSnoop. Finally we also
examined RAW files in which the date and time entries
were altered using ExifTool.
1) Thumbnail, Preview and Raw Image Parameters :
The first two parameters extracted are the dimensions of
the raw image data and of the converted raw image. The
raw image data has the exact resolution as the image
sensor, while the converted image depends on border
4Table II
VARIATIONS IN NEF FILE STRUCTURE
NEF basic structure class 0 class 1 class2 class3
Header x x x x
IFD#0 + picture#0 x x x x
SubIFD#0 + picture#1 x x
SubIFD#1 + picture#2 x x x x
EXIF x x x x
Makernotes + picture#3 x x x
SubIFD#2 + picture#4 x
cameras in class Nikon D1 Nikon D100, D1X, ... Nikon D3, D40, ... Nikon D4, D3200
Table III
EXAMPLES OF RAW HEADER SIGNATURES
Maker/Model Canon 350D Nikon D4 Pentax K-5
Format CR2 NEF DNG
Metadata entry count 14 28 24 2 2 11 0 6 25 31 51 0 7 8 1 17
25 32 51 0 7 8 1 17
37 20 100 0 0 19 0 25
Sensor dimensions 3516× 2328 4992× 3292 4992× 3284
Image dimensions 3456× 2304 4928× 3280 4928× 3264
Preview dimensions 384× 256 160× 120 160× 120
Thumbnail dim. 160× 120 570× 375 640× 480
Thumbnail DQT static tables created dynamically static tables
Quantization table
(Y)
3 2 2 3 5 8 10 12
2 2 3 4 5 11 11 13
3 2 3 5 8 11 13 11
3 3 4 6 10 17 15 12
3 4 7 11 13 21 20 15
5 7 10 12 15 20 21 17
9 12 15 17 20 23 23 19
14 17 18 19 21 19 20 19
28 19 17 28 41 69 88 105
21 21 24 33 45 100 103 95
24 22 28 41 69 98 119 96
24 29 38 50 88 150 138 107
31 38 64 96 117 187 177 132
60 60 95 110 139 179 194 158
110 110 134 150 177 208 206 174
124 158 163 169 193 172 177 170
Quantization table
(Cb/Cr)
3 3 5 9 19 19 19 19
3 4 5 13 19 19 19 19
5 5 11 19 19 19 19 19
9 13 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
29 31 41 81 170 170 170 170
31 36 45 114 170 170 170 170
41 45 96 170 170 170 170 170
81 114 170 170 170 170 170 170
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
Preview DHT static tables created dynamically static tables
DC (Y) 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 0 1 125 0 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC (Cb) 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 1 125
DC (Cr) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AC (Y) 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 0 1 125 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 0 1 125
AC (Cb) 2 1 2 4 4 3 4 7 5 4 4 0 1 2 119 2 1 2 4 4 3 4 7 5 4 4 0 1 2 119
AC (Cr) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Preview dimensions 1536× 1024 4928× 3280 4928× 3264
Preview DQT static tables created dynamically static tables
Quantization table
(Y)
3 2 2 3 5 8 10 12
2 2 3 4 5 11 11 13
3 2 3 5 8 11 13 11
3 3 4 6 10 17 15 12
3 4 7 11 13 21 20 15
5 7 10 12 15 20 21 17
9 12 15 17 20 23 23 19
14 17 18 19 21 19 20 19
46 32 29 46 69 116 147 176
35 35 40 55 75 168 173 159
40 38 46 69 116 165 199 162
40 49 64 84 147 251 231 179
52 64 107 162 197 255 255 223
69 101 159 185 234 255 255 255
142 185 225 251 255 255 255 255
208 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
Quantization table
(Cb/Cr)
3 3 5 9 19 19 19 19
3 4 5 13 19 19 19 19
5 5 11 19 19 19 19 19
9 13 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
49 52 69 136 255 255 255 255
52 61 75 191 255 255 255 255
69 75 162 255 255 255 255 255
136 191 255 255 255 255 255 255
255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255
Preview DHT static tables created dynamically static tables
DC (Y) 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 0 1 125 0 1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
DC (Cb) 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 1 125
DC (Cr) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AC (Y) 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 0 1 125 2 1 3 3 2 4 3 5 5 4 4 0 0 1 125
AC (Cb) 2 1 2 4 4 3 4 7 5 4 4 0 1 2 119 2 1 2 4 4 3 4 7 5 4 4 0 1 2 119
AC (Cr) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5parameters that are stored in the metadata. The two JPEG
compressed preview or thumbnail images were analysed
in the same manner as JPEG preview images by Kee
et al. [2]. From each image the dimensions as well as
the quantization and Huffman table parameters were col-
lected. From the uncompressed thumbnail image only the
dimensions were collected. Not every camera creates all
preview or thumbnail images. In this case the parameters
of the missing images are set to 0.
2) Metadata Parameters : From the metadata in the
IFD#0 segment we collect the count of all 6 IFD segments.
From the EXIF segment, EXIF metadata and Makernotes
are counted separately. Additionally we count the number





(5) thumbnail/preview image IFD
(6) thumbnail/preview image IFD
(7) additional image IFDs
(8) raw image data IFD
As the IFD#0 segment itself contains a thumbnail or
preview image, (6) and (7) represent one of the other
images in the order they appear in the file. Missing
segments in this sequence and images that are not stored
in a sperate IFD segment are set to 0.
D. Examination Results
Canon cameras proof to be the most consistent in the
general structure of the RAW files they produce. Only the
compression format of one of the thumbnail images varies
between uncompressed and JPEG compression in different
camera models. The other JPEG compressed thumbnail
image has a constant size of 160×120. All Canon camera
models have a static set of quantization and Huffman
tables for each JPEG compressed thumbnail and preview
image. The Huffman Table is identical throughout Canons
camera range. In their higher priced camera range Canon
has introduced the M-Raw and S-Raw formats as options
to regular RAW images. In order to enhance the time and
memory space these RAW images need for being stored,
they only have a medium or small file size compared to
the original. Consequently there are different signatures for
different RAW types from every of these camera models.
The main difference of these formats lies in the resolution
of the raw image, other parameters are the same.
The general structure of NEF files is less consistent
throughout the files created by different Nikon camera
models. Not every Nikon camera creates every preview
and thumbnail IFD. Nikon D800E and D4 cameras even
add an additional preview image IFD to the structure.
The uncompressed thumbnail image has a constant size
of 160×120. The JPEG compressed thumbnail image has
in most cases a size of 570 × 375. Nikon cameras adapt
their quantization and Huffman tables with every image. A
variation in whether the ’ISO’ entry in the EXIF segment
is used, depending on the ISO settings creates two different
metadata signatures for some Nikon camera models. These
varying parameters lead to a number of different possible
signatures for one single camera model.
Except for the K-01 model, Pentax cameras examined
are as consistent as Canon cameras. Just as Nikon cameras
they create uncompressed thumbnail images with a size
of 160 × 120. The other JPEG compressed thumbnail
image has a static size of 640 × 480. Quantization and
Huffman tables are, except from the K-01 model, static.
All Pentax camera models examined even use the same
Huffman table. Once converted to DNG format, RAW files
will loose their original signature. The metadata structure
changes, thumbnail and preview images get recreated with
different dimensions, quantization and Huffman tables.
The only characteristic properties unaltered are the di-
mensions of the raw image and the Makernotes count.
Although the signature of RAW files converted to DNG
depends on the original file, some parameters, such as the
quantization and Huffman tables are characteristic to DNG
Converter.
All cameras examined create a unique parameter signa-
ture. Metadata proves to be the most significant property
of RAW images, closely followed by the sensor and
thumbnail/preview dimensions. 63% of the Canon cameras
examined have a unique combination of all 8 metadata
parameters, 37% are in a class of size 2. All Nikon cameras
create unique metadata signatures. From the metadata
entries the Makernotes count is the most distinct.
NEF images, in which date and time entries have
been altered using ExifTool, can still be detected as the
’OriginalDate’ entry in the EXIF segment is deleted in the
process. When resaving NEF files, ExifTool also changes
the sequence of the files segments. In altered files the
EXIF IFD including the Makernotes is put at the end of
the file. Although a change in the segment sequence is
not detectable by the method proposed in this paper, it
indicates detectability by the method proposed by Gloe
[3]. In CR2 files, altered with ExifTool could not be
detected by our method.
E. Forensic Software
Most software packages that can be used to alter
RAW images also provide functionalities to analyse them.
ExifTool can visualize the file structure and reasonable
number of entries in the different segments. Furthermore
allows to extract preview and thumbnail images from CR2
and NEF files. JPEG preview and thumbnail images can
also be extracted and then analysed using JPEGSnoop. It
can extract all header information and provide a list of
possible source devices, based on the files characteristics.
But as Kornblum [6] mentioned in his paper, it’s prediction
abilities are limited to static cases. Using static DQT
and DHT with a database of characteristics it takes a
guess on the source camera or processing software. This
database is fed by users of JPEGSnoop, by committing
the characteristics of unknown camera models. For most
preview images, extracted from CR2 images, JPEGSnoop
listed the camera model used in a list of possible source
devices. Dave Coffin’s open source library DCRAW [14]
offers a variety of functions. A command line based on
DCRAW can be used to decode a RAW image file, save
them as an JPEG or TIFF files and extract metadata or
preview images.
6F. Forensic Databases
To increase the effectivety of the techniques discussed
and to decrease the costs of an investigation trustworthy
databases, that store the characteristics and sample images
of various cameras or software packages are needed. For-
tunately, several multimedia forensic groups are building
such databases for research purposes. One of these is the
’Dresden Image Database’ [15], which provides sample
images in different formats.
IV. CONCLUSION
Taking a closer look at their structure, this paper iden-
tified characteristics in common RAW image files that
can be used in a file forensic analysis. Results of the
examination indicate that an authentication based on CR2,
NEF or DNG file information can be as effective as it is
based JPEG file headers. We have also shown that there
are still alterations undetectable by this method. Modifying
already existing metadata entries such as date and time




JPEG is commonly used to refer to the JPEG Image
File Format (JFIF) and its compression algo-
rithm proposed by the JPEG commission.
RAW is a general term that refers to a huge variety
of lossless image file formats used by manu-
facturers of digital photo cameras.
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